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Time is an essential feature in bipolar disorder (BP). Manic 
and depressed BP patients perceive the speed of time as either 
too fast or too slow. The present article combines theoreti-
cal and empirical approaches to integrate phenomenological, 
psychological, and neuroscientific accounts of abnormal time 
perception in BP. Phenomenology distinguishes between per-
ception of inner time, ie, self-time, and outer time, ie, world-
time, that desynchronize or dissociate from each other in BP: 
inner time speed is abnormally slow (as in depression) or fast 
(as in mania) and, by taking on the role as default-mode func-
tion, impacts and modulates the perception of outer time speed 
in an opposite way, ie, as too fast in depression and too slow 
in mania. Complementing, psychological investigation show 
opposite results in time perception, ie, time estimation and 
reproduction, in manic and depressed BP. Neuronally, time 
speed can be indexed by neuronal variability, ie, SD. Our own 
empirical data show opposite changes in manic and depressed 
BP (and major depressive disorder [MDD]) with abnormal 
SD balance, ie, SD ratio, between somatomotor and sensory 
networks that can be associated with inner and outer time. 
Taken together, our combined theoretical-empirical approach 
demonstrates that desynchronization or dissociation between 
inner and outer time in BP can be traced to opposite neuronal 
variability patterns in somatomotor and sensory networks. 
This opens the door for individualized therapeutic “normal-
ization” of neuronal variability pattern in somatomotor and 
sensory networks by stimulation with TMS and/or tDCS.
Introduction
Bipolar disorder (BP) is a psychiatric disorder that can 
be characterized by opposite symptoms in affective, 
cognitive, psychomotor, and social domains.1–7 One cen-
tral feature potentially underlying these various symp-
toms is the perception of time which has been pointed 
out already by earlier psychiatrists as E.  Minkoswksi, 
K. Jaspers, V. van Gebsattel, and H. Tellenbach as well 
as more recent ones like G. Stanghellini and T. Fuchs.8–13 
Both phenomenological and psychological investiga-
tions show that manic BP patients often perceive time 
as abnormally accelerated and thus as extremely fast. 
In contrast, depressed BP patients perceive time and its 
speed as extremely slow and retarded.8,10,14,15 The exact 
neuronal mechanisms underlying such opposite changes 
in time speed perception as either abnormally fast or slow 
remain unclear though.
Abnormal time speed perception concerns the subjec-
tive experience and perception of the speed of time; ie, 
“inner time consciousness”—time is perceived subjec-
tively as slow or fast even if  the objective duration of time 
can be estimated accurately.8,15,16 Subjective time speed 
perception in healthy subjects has been tested in fMRI 
using tasks that require the estimation of interval dura-
tion. This revealed involvement of regions in somatomo-
tor network including supplementary motor area (SMA), 
premotor cortex, medial and superior frontal gyrus, infe-
rior parietal cortex, pallidum and putamen, insula as well 
as sensory regions, ie, sensory network, in healthy sub-
jects (see below for details).17–19 Whether depressed and 
manic BP patients show changes in specifically these net-
works remains to be investigated though.
In addition to regions and networks, the neuronal mea-
sure that is relevant for specifically time speed perception 
needs to be determined. Traditionally, the amplitude is 
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considered the main neuronal measure of task-evoked 
activity. More recently, the variability of the amplitude, 
ie, its SD has been introduced as additional measure of 
neuronal activity for both resting-state and task-evoked 
activity.11,20 Neuronal variability measures the degree of 
change in amplitude of neuronal activity levels from time 
point to time point. As such neuronal variability indexes 
the speed of neuronal activity which, on the perceptual 
level, may transform into time speed perception (see 
below for details).
Based on these findings, abnormal time speed per-
ception in manic and depressed BP should be related to 
abnormal, ie, low or high, degrees of neuronal variability, 
ie, SD, in somatomotor and sensory networks. Given that 
time perception, ie, inner time consciousness, remains 
independent of any specific task or stimuli, one would 
expect abnormal SD levels already to be present in the 
spontaneous or resting-state activity of somatomotor and 
sensory networks (see11 for first results in this direction as 
well as21 for the need to associate behavioral features to 
the resting-state). Neuronal variability in somatomotor 
and sensory networks including their abnormal changes 
in BP remains to be investigated though.
The general overarching aim of our article is to review 
and investigate the relationship between time speed per-
ception and neuronal variability (SD) in BP. For that 
we combine a theoretical review of phenomenological 
and psychological features of time speed experience and 
perception with analysis of neuroscientific, ie, empiri-
cal data on neuronal variability in BP and its different 
phases. Such integration of experiential-phenomenal 
accounts and neuronal data presupposes methodologi-
cally what has recently been called “neurophenomenal 
approach.”12,13
The concept of neurophenomenal approach describes 
a methodological strategy that directly links subjective 
experience and its phenomenal features with neuronal 
mechanisms of the brain. Rather than being mediated 
by cognitive, affective, social, or sensorimotor functions, 
the neurophenomenal approach presupposes direct link-
age and translation of specific neuronal measures into 
specific experiential or phenomenal features (this direct 
linkage distinguishes the neurophenomenal from the 
neurophenomenological approach where the link is more 
indirect as mediated by specifically sensorimotor and cog-
nitive functions).12,13,22,23 Thereby the temporal and spatial 
dimensions of the brain’s spontaneous activity supposedly 
play a central role in translating neuronal changes into 
phenomenal experience and ultimately psychopathologi-
cal symptoms. The neurophenomenal approach is thus 
closely linked with a particular form of psychopathol-
ogy namely “Spatiotemporal Psychopathology.”3,4,12,13 
Spatiotemporal Psychopathology claims that psycho-
pathological symptoms are based on abnormal spa-
tiotemporal organization of the brain’s spontaneous 
activity.3,4,12,13 This is, for instance, the case in abnormal 
time speed perception in BP; the underlying neural cor-
relates remain unclear and are therefore the focus in the 
present article.
Phenomenology of Time: Perception of Inner and Outer 
Time in BP
Extension of Time—Dysbalance Between Past, Present, 
and Future in “Inner Time Consciousness”
Time is not a unitary phenomenon but includes different 
forms of time. The most common distinction is the one 
between subjective and objective time.9 Subjective time 
is the time we subjectively perceive or experience in our 
consciousness which is therefore also described as “lived 
time” or “inner time consciousness.”8,24–27 In contrast, 
objective time is the way we cognize and measure time 
in a way that remains independent of our own subjec-
tive perception of time—since time is made explicit here 
Fuchs8 also speaks of “explicit time” (as distinguished 
from the lived time as “implicit time”).
Inner time consciousness or lived time can be charac-
terized by 2 main features, temporal extension and speed 
or temporal flow.8 Temporal extension means that we 
perceive time in an extended way; ie, beyond the pres-
ent moment (“primal presentation”) which stretches into 
both past, ie, “retention,” and “future,” ie, protention.8,22 
We perceive time in our consciousness as continuous in 
that it stretches in a virtual way from the past over the 
present to the future moment—this constitutes “tempo-
ral continuity” in our perception of time which has been 
described as “stream of consciousness.”12,22 Such consti-
tution of temporal continuity is automatic and uncon-
scious (“passive”) amounting to what philosophers refer 
to as “passive synthesis.”28
Temporal extension and passive synthesis are impor-
tant also in psychopathological terms. Many phenom-
enological authors suggest abnormal, ie, disrupted and 
fragmented, “inner time consciousness” in schizophrenia 
(see8,22,28,29 for details). As pointed out already by ear-
lier psychiatrists like E. Minkoswksi, K. Jaspers, V. van 
Gebsattel, and H. Tellenbach as well as more recent ones 
as G.  Stanghellini and T.  Fuchs, bipolar patients too 
exhibit changes in temporal extension though in a differ-
ent way: rather than showing disruption or fragmenta-
tion of time, they experience abnormal shift or focus of 
time towards either the past (“past-focus” as in depressed 
BP) or the present/future (“present/future-focus” as in 
manic BP).9,10,30,31
Speed of Time—Dysbalance Between Inner (Self-
Time) and Outer (World-Time) Time
In addition to temporal extension, we need to consider 
yet a second feature of inner time consciousness, mainly 
its speed or temporal flow. We perceive the speed of events 
in time as less or more fast which remains somewhat 
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independent of their objective duration. Fuchs8 traces 
time speed perception to what he describes as “conation”: 
the concept of conation refers to the energy, urge, drive, 
momentum, or vital force that is central for constituting 
the speed of time. Analogous to passive synthesis that 
constitutes temporal extension (see above), conation is 
conceived as the mechanism that allows for constituting 
the speed or flow of time.
The speed or flow of time is constituted in an abnor-
mal way in BP. Depressed BP patients (and patients with 
major depressive disorder [MDD]) often perceive abnor-
mal slowness of time which, in the most extreme case, 
can lead to the perception of a complete “standstill” or 
even absence of time.8–10,32 Conversely, manic BP patients 
often perceive abnormal fastening of time. BP can con-
sequently be characterized by a disturbance in conation 
that constitutes the speed or flow of time either abnor-
mally slow (as in depressed BP) or fast (as in manic BP).
Why is there such altered conation with abnormal con-
stitution of time speed? Fuchs8 traces the origin of cona-
tion back to an even more basic and fundamental form of 
time, “intersubjective temporality.” Intersubjective tem-
porality or “basic contemporality” concerns the way we 
perceive the time outside of us as related to other persons 
and events in the world, ie, “world time,” in relation to the 
time inside ourselves, ie, “self-time.”8,33 Intersubjective 
temporality or “basic contemporality” is, for instance, 
paradigmatically manifest during dancing that can be 
characterized by synchronization between inner and 
outer time: we align and attune our arms and legs and 
thus our body’s inner time, ie, self-time, to the speed of 
the outer time of the music, ie, world-time (figure 1a).
Fuchs8 postulates that inner and outer time, ie, self- 
and world-time, are no longer synchronized in BP. The 
inner time, ie, self-time is either too fast or too slow when 
compared to the outer time, ie, world-time. There is, so 
Fuchs,8 either abnormal retardation (as in depression) or 
acceleration (as in mania) of inner time which, in turn, 
changes its relationship with outer time: inner time, ie, 
self-time, runs either behind (as in the case of its retarda-
tion in depression) or ahead (as in the case of its accelera-
tion in mania) of outer time, ie, world-time. The changes 
in the relationship between inner and outer time strongly 
shape how subjects experience and perceive the speed of 
events in outer time, ie, world-time.
Compared to the retarded inner time, events in outer 
time are perceived as abnormally fast—this is the case in 
depression (“I can’t keep up with the speed of events”). 
While the opposite holds in mania where the accelerated 
inner time predisposes subjects to perceive events in outer 
Fig. 1. 
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time as abnormally slow (“Everything is so slow”).8,9 
Accordingly, the speed of inner time serves as template, 
ie, baseline or reference, against which the speed of outer 
time is set and compared—inner time speed thus exerts 
what can be described as “default-mode function” for the 
speed of outer time (see below for more details on this 
point).
Psychology of Time: Objective Measurement of Inner 
Time and Outer Time in BP
Psychology of Inner Time and Outer Time—Time 
Estimation and (Re)Production
Psychological investigation of time focuses on the objec-
tive measurement of both inner and outer time. The 
objective measurement of inner time concerns the per-
ceived speed or flow of the subjects’ own inner time, ie, 
self  time (as for instance in visual analogue scales or 
other questionnaires15; see below for details). While the 
objective measurement of outer time, ie, world time is 
often performed by letting subjects perceive and estimate 
certain durations of events (like a video) in outer time 
(see,14,16 see also34,35).
Bschor et  al15 showed that depressed patients per-
ceived time as abnormally slow (as rated on a visual ana-
logue scale) with a mean speed of −15.7  mm whereas 
manic patients perceived time as abnormally fast with 
+15.8  mm on the VAS (healthy subjects were around 
1  mm). Another study by Mahlberg et  al14 investigated 
time reproduction task. Manic patients reproduced the 
short intervals (1  s and 6 s) correctly while they under-
reproduced (ie, reproduced it as shorter than it actually 
was) the longer interval (37 s). Depressed patients showed 
the opposite pattern; they reproduced the longer time 
interval (37  s) correctly but over-reproduced (ie, repro-
duced it as longer than it actually was) the shorter time 
intervals (1 s, 6  s) (see also36 and15). How are over- and 
under-reproduction of time intervals related to the phe-
nomenological description of inner and outer time? That 
shall be explicated in the following.
From Phenomenology to Psychology of Time—Inner 
Time as Default-Mode Function and Template for 
Perception of Outer Time
How do the psychological results stand in relation to the 
phenomenological descriptions? The time reproduction 
results reflect what the phenomenologists describe as 
desynchronization between inner and outer time. In the 
case of time reproduction, the duration of events in outer 
time, ie, a particular time interval in the external world, 
must be reproduced—this is possible by comparing the 
supposed duration of the interval in outer time with the 
actual duration of the subject’s inner time. The inner 
time and its duration serve as template for estimating and 
reproducing the duration in outer time. If  the subject’s 
inner time, ie, self  time, is somewhat synchronized with 
outer time, ie, world time, there should be no major dis-
crepancies between given and reproduced times in time 
reproduction tasks. The inner time and its duration pro-
vide the proper template for reproducing the duration of 
intervals in outer time.
Such synchronization is disrupted though when the 
subject’s inner time is by itself  abnormally retarded or 
accelerated. This leads to desynchronization between 
inner and outer time which, in turn, predisposes subjects 
to either under- or over-reproduce the given time inter-
vals in time reproduction tasks. The inner time and its 
either abnormally long or short duration provide sim-
ply the “wrong” template for reproducing intervals in 
outer time. The intervals in outer time are then quasi by 
default over- or under-reproduced as either too long or 
short. That is exactly what the data show in manic and 
depressed BP.
How can we describe the default-mode function of 
inner time for outer time in more detail? What is relevant 
for estimating and reproducing the duration of events in 
outer time (as it is required in time reproduction tasks) is 
not their objective duration as conceived by itself  in an 
isolated way, ie, independent of the subject’s inner time. 
Instead, following the phenomenological account of time 
(see above), it is rather how the duration of the events in 
outer time stands in relation to the inner time: the speed 
and duration of inner time serves as template, ie, base-
line or reference against which the duration of events in 
outer time is compared or matched. The duration of the 
event in outer time is consequently estimated and repro-
duced relative to the speed and duration of the ongoing 
inner time—inner time and its speed and duration serve 
as default-mode function for estimating and reproducing 
outer time.
Due to its role as default-mode, ie, baseline or refer-
ence, changes in inner time like abnormal retardation or 
acceleration affect how the duration or speed of events in 
outer time is perceived and subsequently estimated and 
reproduced.
If  the speed of inner time is retarded and thus too slow, 
as in depression, one applies an abnormal default-mode 
or template as baseline or reference for estimating and 
reproducing intervals in outer time. One consequently 
perceives and reproduces especially short time inter-
vals in outer time as relatively longer and thus as slow 
and too long (when compared to their objective dura-
tion)—this results in over-reproduction of their duration 
(“everything takes longer and is slower”) as observed by 
Mahlberg et al14 (see above). The opposite is the case in 
mania: applying the inner time that is abnormally fast as 
template, ie, reference or baseline leads one to perceive 
and subsequently under-reproduce (especially longer) 
durations of events in outer time as shorter and faster 
than they are in reality (“everything takes shorter and is 
faster”) (figure 1b).
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Neuroscience of Time: Neuronal Variability in 
Somatomotor and Sensory Networks in BP
“Somatomotor Network” and “Sensory Network” 
Mediate Inner Time and Outer Time
Recent meta-analysis in healthy subjects investigated the 
regions implicated in time perception; ie, interval timing 
and duration of events (see18 as well as17). Wiener et al18 
and Ortuno et  al19 conducted meta-analyses of various 
neuroimaging studies in healthy subjects investigating 
explicit and implicit interval timing by perception of 
stimulus duration (sub-seconds vs supra-seconds) in both 
sensory and motor domains. Both meta-analyses singled 
out various somatomotor regions as being implicated in 
implicit and explicit time speed perception; these included 
regions like SMA, middle frontal gyrus, right thalamus, 
cerebellum, and left putamen (as well as other regions like 
left and right insula and left superior temporal gyrus). 
Since they are apparently involved in time speed percep-
tion, these regions have been described as “neural timing 
circuit.”37,38
The various subcortical and cortical regions form the 
somatomotor network and are central for the internal 
planning (like middle frontal gryus), preparing, initiat-
ing (like supplementary area), and executing (like puta-
men, cerebellum, and thalamus) action and movement 
(see also17). Planning, preparing, and executing action 
and movement are internally-originating activities: they 
involve the constitution of the subject’s own time in order 
to provide interval timing and duration for the subse-
quently internally-initiated and executed actions and 
movements.17 We therefore suppose that neural activity 
in the somatomotor network is specifically relevant for 
constituting the speed of inner time, ie, self-time.
How about outer time, ie, world-time? We traced inner 
time to a neural network, the somatomotor network, 
whose neural activity and its timing are determined and 
originates internally. In contrast to inner time, outer time 
is rather determined externally by the events and their 
duration in the outside world. The external events are 
first and foremost processed in sensory regions like visual 
and auditory cortex. Owe consequently can suppose that 
neural activity in sensory regions and, more generally, the 
sensory network is central in constituting the speed of 
outer time, ie, world-time.
How do the neural substrates of inner and outer time 
stand in relation to each other? Somatomotor and sen-
sory processing are closely intertwined as manifest in the 
coupling between perception and action.39,40 For instance, 
external events including their duration are processed in 
sensory regions which, at the same time, are modulated 
by reafferent processing from the somatomotor net-
work.39 Moreover, there is extensive functional connectiv-
ity between somatomotor and sensory networks allowing 
for their reciprocal modulation39,40—this makes it rather 
likely that the somatomotor network serves as reference 
or baseline against which the sensory network is set and 
compared. Rather than investigating neural activity in 
sensory and somatomotor networks independently of 
each other, one may therefore want to focus on their rela-
tion or balance as it can be operationalized by their ratio 
(see below for details). This is also well compatible with 
the phenomenological assumption that the speed of inner 
time serves as default-mode; ie, as baseline or reference 
for outer time.
Neuronal Variability Mediates Dynamic Change and 
Time Speed on the Neuronal Level
How does neural activity in somatomotor and sensory 
networks transform into perception of inner and outer 
time speed? The neurophenomenal approach postulates 
that what is described as time speed on the perceptual 
and phenomenological level may find its counterpart in 
the speed of neural activity. We consequently need to 
search for a neuronal measure that indexes the change 
and thereby the speed of neural activity.
The most traditional measure of neural activity is the 
amplitude that is evoked by specific stimuli or tasks. The 
amplitude measures the signal change as induced by the 
stimulus or task. However, what we determine as ampli-
tude results from averaging across different trials of one 
and the same stimulus or task—this cancels out or elimi-
nates the dynamic changes and thus the speed of neural 
activity. Specifically, the averaging across different points 
in time makes the amplitude a rather static measure 
which therefore remains unable to account for the change 
or speed of neural activity. We therefore want to search 
for a more dynamic neuronal measure to index neuronal 
change and thereby speed on the neuronal level.
Neuronal change can be measured by neuronal vari-
ability that has recently been introduced as novel measure 
into brain imaging. Neuronal variability is measured by 
calculating either the SD of the amplitude20 or the ampli-
tude of low frequency fluctuations (ALFF).20 Neuronal 
variability, ie, SD or ALFF, reflects the dynamic change 
of neural activity and its amplitude across different points 
in time: both measures (that are more or less equivalent) 
describe and measure the degree of change in amplitude 
from one point in time to another and ultimately across 
the whole range of time points obtained during measure-
ment of resting-state (or task-evoked) activity. In short, 
neuronal variability measures the change across different 
points in time.
How is neuronal variability related to the speed of 
time? If, for instance, the amplitude is the same between 
2 or several points in time, neuronal variability, ie, SD or 
ALFF, remains zero—neuronal activity remains rather 
static, does not show much change, and is therefore 
“slow.” If, in contrast, there is rapid change in ampli-
tude from one time point to the next one, variability is 
rather high. In that case, neuronal activity is extremely 
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dynamic, shows high degree of change, and is therefore 
“fast.” Taken together, the speed of neuronal activity is 
indexed in an indirect or relative way by the degree of 
change, ie, variability from one point in time to another: 
high degrees of neuronal variability index high speed of 
neuronal activity whereas low levels of neuronal variabil-
ity may rather reflect low speed of neuronal activity.
How does neuronal variability as indexing the speed 
of neuronal activity transform into experience and per-
ception of the speed of time? Since it indexes the speed 
of neuronal activity, we hypothesize that neuronal vari-
ability transforms into corresponding speed of time on 
perceptual and phenomenal levels. More specifically, high 
neuronal variability may lead subjects to experience and 
perceive time as fast while low neuronal variability trans-
forms into experience and perception of time as slow. 
This, as we will see in the following, is indeed supported 
by the results in BP (and MDD).
Abnormal Neuronal Variability in Somatomotor and 
Sensory Networks in BP
Previous studies investigating neuronal variability (eg, 
ALFF) in resting-state in BP largely confirmed abnor-
mal changes in the regions of both somatomotor and 
sensory networks.41–45 Moreover, EEG studies observed 
consistently increase in beta power in resting-state in 
BP.46–50 Since beta is closely related to specifically motor 
function,46,51 beta power increase may be well compatible 
with the supposed role of the somatomotor network in 
constituting inner time. Unfortunately, there are no stud-
ies available yet that investigate the involvement of beta 
frequency in specifically time perception, ie, perception 
of time speed.
The specification of neuronal variability changes for 
manic and depressed phases BP remains unclear though. 
If  inner time as mediated by the somatomotor network 
does indeed serve as baseline or reference, one would 
expect variability changes to be present already in the 
brain’s spontaneous activity as measured in the resting-
state. We therefore focused our own empirical investiga-
tion on resting-state neuronal variability in somatomotor 
and sensory networks. Specifically, we investigated rest-
ing-state or spontaneous activity SD in somatomotor 
and sensory networks in our data set of manic (n = 20) 
and depressed (n = 20) BP patients and healthy subjects 
(n  =  40) (see11 for details of patients and methods of 
analyses).
Following our hypothesis of the relevance of their 
balance (see above), we plotted the SD ratio between 
somatomotor and sensory networks. This yielded highly 
significant differences with opposite patterns in manic 
and depressed BP subjects and healthy subjects (figure 2). 
Specifically, the somatomotor/sensory SD ratio in Slow5 
(0.01 to 0.027Hz) was significantly different between 
manic, depressed, and control subjects (ANOVA: 
F = 5.407; P =  .006, Bonferroni corrected), with manic 
patients showing significant higher ratio when compared 
to depressed patients (t  =  3.160; P  =  .003, Bonferroni 
corrected) (figure 2). No significant differences between 
groups were found for the same measure in standard fre-
quency band (0.01 to 0.1 Hz) and Slow4 (0.027 to 0.073 
Hz) (F = 0.212 and P =  .809; F = 2.262 and P =  .111; 
respectively).
These results were further supported by analogous 
SD differences between groups within each network 
itself. Unlike their ratio, SD differences within either 
somatomotor or sensory network did not yield statistical 
Fig. 2. 
AQ8
Copyedited by: SA
Page 7 of 10
7.5
7.10
7.15
7.20
7.25
7.30
7.35
7.40
7.45
7.50
7.55
7.56
7.60
7.65
7.70
7.75
7.80
7.85
7.90
7.95
7.100
7.105
7.110
7.112
Time Perception, Networks and Bipolar Disorder
differences between groups though (due to large SE in 
the signal). This further points out the crucial relevance 
of the balance between somatomotor and sensory net-
works. The SD in both somatomotor and sensory net-
works may therefore be dependent upon and processed 
relative to each other as it is supported by their recipro-
cal dependence and functional connectivity (see above). 
Moreover, given that inner time serves as default-mode 
for outer time (see above), one may suppose that somato-
motor SD serves as default-mode and thus as baseline 
or reference for sensory SD—that remains to be shown 
though (figure 2).
Most interestingly, the results in BP showed significant 
results for the slowest frequency, Slow5 (0.01 to 0.027 
Hz), whereas no significant differences were obtained for 
higher frequencies like Slow4 (0.027 to 0.073 Hz). Slow5 
shows stronger power and longer cycle duration than 
Slow4 and can therefore be considered the “temporal 
basement”22,23,52 of  the brain. As such, changes in Slow5 
may reverberate to higher frequencies including beta (see 
above). Neuronally, the changes in Slow5 may also affect 
the coupling of the slower frequencies like Slow4 and 5 
to higher frequency like delta, theta, alpha and beta, ie, 
cross-frequency coupling (CFC).53 However, the exact 
relationship between variability and CFC as well as its 
changes in BP remain unclear.
We also investigate SD in the same neural networks in 
a separate group of MDD patients when compared to 
healthy subjects. Following our results in bipolar depres-
sion, one would expect lower SD ratio between somato-
motor and visual networks in MDD patients when 
compared to healthy subjects; this was exactly the case 
(supplementary figure 1).
Finally, we correlated SD ratios in manic and depressed 
BP subjects with psychopathological ratings in Hamilton 
depression rating scale and Young mania rating scale. 
This yielded significant correlation: the higher the SD 
ratio between somatomotor and sensory networks, the 
higher the manic severity scores and the lower the depres-
sive severity score. These results underscore the relevance 
of altered spatiotemporal balance in SD for psycho-
pathological symptoms (figure 2).
Neurophenomenology of Time: From Neural 
Network Disbalance Over Time Desynchronization to 
Psychopathological Symptoms
Phenomenological investigation suggests desynchroni-
zation between inner and outer time in opposite direc-
tions in depressed and manic BP patients. This is further 
extended in psychological investigation where objective 
measures show abnormal slowness or fastness of specifi-
cally inner time as well as abnormally perceived duration 
of external events in our time (see above). Given such 
desynchronization between inner and outer time, one 
would expect analogous disbalance in their respectively 
underlying neural networks, ie, somatomotor and sen-
sory networks. This is exactly what our data showed.
Specifically, our data demonstrate that the SD ratio 
between somatomotor and sensory networks is abnor-
mally tilted towards the somatomotor network in mania. 
In contrast, the SD ratio is shifted in the opposite direc-
tion towards the sensory network in depression. Healthy 
subjects occupy a middle position whereas the somato-
motor-sensory SD ratio is not shifted towards either 
extreme. Taken all together, this suggests a neural contin-
uum of different possible somatomotor-sensory SD bal-
ances: at both extremes of the continuum, the SD ratio is 
tilted towards either network (as in depressed or manic 
BP as well as in MDD) while in the middle of the con-
tinuum the SD is rather balanced between both networks 
(figures 3a and b).
How does the neural continuum of different possible 
somatomotor-sensory SD balances translate into expe-
rience and perception of time speed? We suppose an 
analogous perceptual-experiential continuum of differ-
ent possible constellations between inner and outer time 
speed. Depressed patients show decreased neuronal vari-
ability in the somatomotor network which, experientially 
and perceptually, results in retardation of inner time.
Moreover, this tilts the SD balance towards the sensory 
network which predisposes these subjects towards experi-
encing and perceiving events in outer time as abnormally 
fast. The manic patients, in contrast, show the opposite 
pattern. Here the SD is abnormally high in the somato-
motor network which, experientially and perceptually, 
transforms into acceleration of inner time. That tilts 
the SD ratio towards the somatosensory network at the 
expense of the sensory network whose low SD leads to 
the experience and perception of events in outer time as 
abnormally slow.
What phenomenologically is described as desynchroni-
zation between inner and outer time may thus be traced 
on the neuronal level to the shifting of somatomotor-sen-
sory SD ratios towards opposite extremes. Following the 
phenomenologist’s terminology, one can say that the SD’s 
in somatomotor and sensory networks desynchronize or 
dissociate from each other. The somatomotor network 
SD is either abnormally fast or slow for which reason it 
desynchronizes or dissociates from sensory SD. Due to 
the fact that somatomotor SD may serve as default-mode 
function (see above) for sensory SD, the latter will change 
in an opposite or reciprocal way when compared to the 
former hence the opposite changes in inner and outer 
time speed in BP. Finally, our data show that the abnor-
mal SD network balance correlated in opposite ways 
with manic and depressive symptoms. This underscores 
the direct relevance of spatiotemporal changes in resting-
state for psychopathological symptoms and their severity.
Future investigations are required to test our neuro-
phenomenal hypothesis. One way could be to directly 
link phenomenological (with subjective questions) and 
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Fig. 3. 
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psychological (with time estimation and reproduction) 
measures of time speed experience and perception with 
neuronal variability in somatomotor and sensory net-
works, in different frequency ranges. Different subjects 
may show SD changes in different frequencies (eg, within 
the Slow5 range) which, clinically, may correspond to 
individually-specific speeds of time in experience and 
perception. Determining the individually-specific altered 
frequency range of somatomotor and sensory SD, and 
correspondent time experience, could be clinically rel-
evant. That, in turn, could serve for individually-specific 
therapeutic intervention. For instance, neuronal vari-
ability in somatomotor and sensory cortical resting-state 
activity could be modulated by applying stimulation in 
the individually specific frequency range with TMS and/
or tDCS to “normalize” the respective individual time 
speed perception and subsequently psychopathological 
symptoms.
Conclusion
We here reviewed and integrated different levels of  time, 
phenomenological, psychological, and neuronal in BP 
in a combined theoretical-empirical investigation. We 
suppose that the opposite disbalance between inner 
and outer time, ie, self- and world-time, in manic and 
depressed BP is closely related to opposite changes in 
neuronal variability in somatomotor and sensory net-
works as supported by our empirical findings. Though 
tentative at this point in time, this amounts to direct tem-
poral correspondence between neuronal and phenome-
nal features, ie, “neurophenomenal correspondence.”22,23 
Both abnormal neuronal and phenomenal measures 
may, in turn, predict somatomotor, sensory, affective, 
and cognitive symptoms during task-evoked activity in 
BP which supposedly result from abnormal temporal 
(and spatial) organization in the brain’s resting state as 
postulated in “Spatiotemporal Psychopathology,”4,12,29 
as basis for an individually-specific diagnosis and 
therapy.
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